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THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY AS QUASI-PUBLIC




In the summer of 2010, months into the catastrophic BP Gulf Oil Spill
and weeks into Mr. Kenneth Feinberg's appointment as administrator of
the $20 billion Gulf Coast Claims Facility negotiated by President Obama
and BP, Mr. Feinberg stated that his compensation from BP was a confi-
dential matter between him and BP.' After increasing calls for disclosure
of his pay, Mr. Feinberg did disclose his firm's compensation, but he contin-
ued to avoid discussions of his pay with claimants, suggesting they should
be concerned with what they received from BP, not what Mr. Feinberg
received from BP.2 BP was paying Mr. Feinberg's two-partner firm
$850,000 a month for their work on the fund.3 BP and Mr. Feinberg's firm
agreed to renegotiate the pay periodically, while Mr. Feinberg continued to
determine eligibility decisions for claimants that could affect leftover claim
funds returned to BP. Were these approaches proper? How should Mr.
Feinberg have proceeded with regard to the determination and disclosure
of his claim-administrator compensation?
The answers to these questions turn on the status of Mr. Feinberg and
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility he administers. As the multidistrict court in
the BP litigation recently held,4 the Gulf Coast Claims Facility is a "hybrid"
entity: although it is funded by BP and seeks releases from claimants of
* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., Temple
University, Beasley School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I thank the organizers and
participants in Mississippi College School of Law's symposium on the BP Gulf Oil Spill, including co-
panelists Jamison Colburn and Edward Sherman and moderator Jeffrey Jackson. I also thank Iman
Nabizadeh for his research assistance, and am grateful for the research support provided to me by
Southwestern Law School.
1. See Daniel Fisher, Feinberg's Pay: Should It Be Disclosed, FORBES, July 19, 2010, http://blogs.
forbes.com/docket/2010/07/19/feinbergs-bp-pay-should-it-be-disclosed/; John Schwartz, For Kenneth
Feinberg, More Delicate Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 07/17/us/
17 feinberg.html; Byron G. Stier, Ken Feinberg Compensation for Administering BP Fund-A Problem
and a Possible Solution, MAss TORT LITIG. BLOG, July 18, 2010, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass
tortlitigation/2010/07/ken-feinberg-compensation-for-administering-bp-fund-a-problem-and-possible-
solution.html.
2. See Daniel Fisher, Feinberg to Disclose Salary, Acknowledges "Perception of Conflict",
FORBES, July 29, 2010, http://blogs.forbes.com/docket/2010/07/29/feinberg-to-disclose-salary-
acknowledges-perception-of-conflict/.
3. See MEM. FROM MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, PARTNER, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, L.L.P. To KEN-
NETH FEINBERG, PARTNER, FEINBERG ROZEN, L.L.P., GULF COAST CLAIM FACILITY: FEINBERG
RoZEN, L.L.P.'s COMPENSATION 8 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://motherjones.com/files/gulf-coast claims-
facilityjfeinberg rozen_11lpsscompenlsation october_8_.201011.pdf.
4. Order at 8-9, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/Oil
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litigation against BP, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility was born in the White
House when President Obama called BP there and publicly vowed to the
claimants in the Gulf that claims would be "fair[ly]" paid and the fund
would be "independent" and "not be controlled by BP."s Because of that
combination of public and private, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility should be
viewed as a quasi-public claims fund, a new fund category for which ethical,
strategic, and policy implications have not yet been mapped.6
The quasi-public fund offers several benefits. Created quickly in re-
sponse to a still-unfolding crisis and crafted in part by an executive branch
that should be committed to public justice, the quasi-public fund allows for
relatively swift movement of compensation to claimants. The BP Gulf oil
spill posed a systemic threat to the Gulf-area economy-slow-moving trial
verdicts may not have prevented a downward economic spiral as coastal
businesses closed.' In addition to speed, the quasi-public claims fund offers
the possibility of reduced legal fees. Defense counsel fees are surely re-
duced, because defense counsel generally still bill hourly, notwithstanding
periodic criticism of that method,8 and the settling of claims within the fund
would reduce the need for defense counsel litigation services. But what
about plaintiff counsel? If claimants can approach the fund trusting they
will receive a fair valuation of their claims, then claimants may also save
money by not having to pay a plaintiff lawyer's fee, which often could
amount to one-third or more of the total recovery.9
But can claimants trust a quasi-public fund? Claimants may be con-
fused about whether a quasi-public claims fund is like a private fund, where
an offered award is equivalent to a settlement offer and an attorney is
Spill/Orders/2220110rderonRecDoc9l2.pdf (finding that "the GCC and Mr. Feinberg are not com-
pletely 'neutral' or indepedent from BP"); see also John Schwartz, Fund Official Not Neutral, Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/us/03feinberg.html.
5. The White House, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill, June 15, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill (last visited July 9,
2011).
6. See Zygumt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed
in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11041, 11045 (2010) (referring to the BP fund as an
"innovation" and "a legal animal that had never before existed, neither corporate nor governmental").
7. One wonders if this would be the case if there were a fully functioning market for litigation
claims. In such a market, litigants might sell some or all of their claims immediately. Although such
outright sale of tort claims is currently generally prohibited, a controversial market for borrowing in
advance of, and dependent on, a judgment is emerging. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add
New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/17
lawsuit.html (discussing nascent lawsuit loan market); Byron G. Stier, Lawsuit Loans, MAss TORT LI-
TIG. BLOG, Jan. 23, 2011, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass-tort-litigation/2011/01/lawsuit-loans.
htm] (raising concerns about regulatory capping of interest rates and encouraging a market-oriented
approach).
8. See, e.g., Daniel W. Whitney, In Defense of Hourly Billing, CORP. COUNSEL, Sept. 18, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202433874848 (arguing that "[w]hen experienced
counsel are engaged for reasonable rates and results are judged nut by a single case but rather by the
overall performance of the firm, the hourly model works").
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROFWL CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (permitting use of contingent fees); Edito-
rial, Contingency Fees and Compassion, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1990 (stating that contingency fees
have been considered "the 'poor man's key to the courthouse' " and that the fee percentage is "usually
one-third of the award").
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needed to evaluate whether to take that offer, or like a public fund, where
claimants might have maximum confidence that full and fair compensation
is being made. Seeking answers to that question, claimants understandably
turn to scrutinizing the structure of a fund to see if it is one they can trust.
Who is paying the claim administrator? How much? How is the claim ad-
ministrator incentivized?
If the quasi-public fund is to be successful in persuading claimants to
opt-in and saving attorneys' fees, the fund needs to assure claimants of its
independence from influence from the tortfeasor funding it. The fund may
do so by pursuing two goals: first, transparency with regard to its compen-
sation structure; and second, utilization of a pay structure that would pre-
serve independence by not permitting any possible monetary reward to the
claim administrator for reducing awards to claimants and returning funds
to the tortfeasor. With regard to pay structure, one method to avoid claim-
administrator bias would employ a fixed fee not subject to renegotiation.
But if the amount of claim-administrator work is unvarying or unpredict-
able, a single fixed fee may not be feasible, and there, an independent over-
sight panel, whose judgment the defendant trusts, might be used to
determine claim-administrator compensation. Such an approach would
draw support and guidance from the experience of class settlements, where
defendants often agree to settle with plaintiffs and pay whatever plaintiff-
counsel fees the judge determines are reasonable.' 0 An oversight panel
might be composed of retired judges who themselves might serve pro bono,
as Mr. Feinberg laudably did in the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund," or
the panel itself might be compensated by the tortfeasor with a single fixed
fee or a monthly fixed fee not subject to renegotiation, which might be
possible in light of the likely more predictable task of merely determining
claim-administrator compensation.
By viewing the origins, benefits, and concerns of the quasi-public fund,
we can answer the opening questions for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and
Mr. Feinberg. In pursuit of transparency, Mr. Feinberg should not have
initially refrained from disclosing his compensation. To the contrary, he
should have affirmatively sought out opportunities to explain his own com-
pensation structure to minimize claimant confusion. In addition, rather
than adopt a fee subject to renegotiation, which might raise concerns of his
catering to the defendant, Mr. Feinberg and BP should have sought to cre-
ate an independent oversight panel, whose judgment BP would trust, to
have discretion to pay Feinberg an appropriate sum for his services. In-
deed, the current trustees of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility consist of a
former federal judge and the current Dean of Washington University Law
10. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(h) (stating that "[i]n a certified class action, the court may award
reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties'
agreement").
11. See David Hechier, Conquering the Challenge, 27 NAT'L L.J. 20, 20 (2004) (discussing that
Lawyer of the Year Kenneth Feinberg performed as 9/11 fund administrator for thirty-three months,
entirely pro bono).
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Schooll 2 -perhaps they could undertake this independent oversight role
for Mr. Feinberg's pay?
These pay-structure issues initially may have seemed tangential to the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility, but in fact, legitimacy and claimant confidence
in the Gulf Coast Claims Facility are essential to its success, as was high-
lighted by a recent federal multidistrict litigation order questioning the
fund." In that order, Judge Barbier scrutinized the relationship of the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility and Mr. Feinberg with BP and found that the Facility
was not "independent."1 4 Accordingly, the court regulated fund communi-
cations with claimants, who were also putative class members in actions
pending before the court." This Article provides a broader context for the
court's concerns, and in the wake of the opinion, offers suggestions that
may help bolster claimants' confidence in the GCCF, as well as future
quasi-public claims funds.
Although I differ with the fund's compensation structure and its lack
of transparency on compensation issues, I do not claim that the BP claims
administrators have done anything unethical as lawyers. In reviewing the
GCCF as a consultant, prominent ethicist and law professor Stephen Gil-
lers also makes no claim of any unethical activity.1 6 My perspective comes
not from legal ethics, but from mass tort litigation: how can we best utilize
and enhance the functioning of this interesting new vehicle, the quasi-pub-
lic claims fund? That is what Gulf Coast Claims Facility administrator Ken
Feinberg has been trying to do in good faith, and my suggestions seek to
help in that common task.
12. See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, dated Aug. 6, 2010, at 1, available at http:/
/media.nola.com/2010_gulf oil spill/other/Trust%20Agreement.pdf (stating that fund trustees will be
the Honorable John S. Martin, Jr., and Dean Kent Syverud).
13. Order, supra note 4, at 9; see also Ali Helgoth, Nelson: BP Claims Process "Unacceptable",
PANAMA CITY NEws HERALD, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.newsherald.com/articles/claims-90930-nelson-
panama.html (stating U.S. Senator Bill Nelson's call for more transparency and White House investiga-
tion into GCCF following the MDL opinion calling into question GCCF's neutrality).
14. Order, supra note 4, at 9 (finding "that the GCCF and Mr. Feinberg are not completely
'neutral' or independent from BP").
15. Id.
16. LETTER FROM STEPHEN GILLERS, THE CRYSTAL EASTMAN PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, TO KENNETH R. FEINBERG, ADMINISTRATOR, GULF COAST CLAIMS FA-
CILITY (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GillersFeinberg--Doc_2010.pdf [herein-
after GILLERS LETTER]; see also Harry R. Weber, Gulf Spill Fund Czar Paying for Ethics Advice,
Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 30, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/decl30/gulf-spill-fund-czar-
paying-ethics-advice! (noting Professor Gillers' compensation of $950 an hour). But see Decl. of Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr., In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (Jan. 15, 2011) (stating that certain statements by Mr. Feinberg and the GCCF
have been "inaccurate and misleading," such as being "entirely independent" of BP). Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 2.4 explicitly authorizes third-party neutral work, though Model Rule 2.4 does
not provide any guidance about pay arrangements. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 2.4. But seeGILLERS LETTER, supra, note 16, at 5--6 (arguing the Model Rule 2.4 does not apply to Mr. Feinberg
and GCCF, because they are administering a compensation scheme and making offers to one claimant
at a time); Andrew M. Perlman, The Ethics of Administering the BP Compensation Fund, LEOAL ET--
ICS FORUM, July 19, 2010, http://www.legalethicsforum.comblog/201/7theethicsof-administering-
the-bp-compensation-fund.html (stating that Model Rule 2.4 would not apply and instead suggesting
possibly the Standards of Conduct for Mediators or Code of Ethics for Arbitrators).
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Part II of this Article details the origins and structure of the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility, focusing on its combination of public and private
aspects. Next, part III discusses the policy benefits and concerns attending
the quasi-public claims fund, and situates the quasi-public fund between
the poles of the public fund and the private fund. Part IV provides a plan
to minimize such concerns, advising the pursuit of transparency and inde-
pendence in claim-administrator compensation. In addition, part IV also
proposes the use of an independent oversight panel to determine claim-
administrator pay in situations where an unpredictable and varying amount
of work precludes determination of a single, fixed fee or a monthly fixed
fee not subject to renegotiation. Finally, part V concludes by endorsing the
proper use of quasi-public claims funds in situations where a tortfeasor ad-
mits responsibility and a fast-developing crisis warrants the attention of
high-level executive officials.
II. THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mex-
ico exploded, killing eleven rig workers and injuring many others.'7 Subse-
quently, nearly five million barrels of oil poured into the Gulf of Mexico.' 8
After a temporary cap in July 2010, the oil well was permanently capped in
September 2010.19 The oil spill had widespread effects on the economy of
the Gulf region. Commercial fishermen, including shrimpers and crabbers,
were unable to fish, resulting in cascading losses to seafood processors and
restaurants.2 0 In addition, the absence of tourists in the coastal areas dur-
ing the summer caused additional losses to hotels and restaurants. 2 1
Soon after the oil spill, the U.S. Coast Guard designated BP a "respon-
sible party" under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, rendering BP strictly liable
for losses from the oil spill.2 2 Under OPA, before suing in court, a claimant
must submit a claim to the responsible party, and if the claim is denied or
not settled within ninety days, then the claimant may sue in court or make
a claim against the back-up industry-wide Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.2 3
OPA-recognized claims include removal costs, 2 4 natural resource dam-
ages,25 personal property damages and attendant economic loss,26 loss Of
17. See Denise M. Pili6, Satisfying Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims: Will Ken Feinberg's Pro-




21. See id. ("An entire culture and way of life are in danger of going extinct, increasing anxiety
and depression among coastal residents.").
22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2011); LETTER FROM THE U.S. COAST GUARD TO BP ExPLORATION
& PRODUCTION, INC. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.ag.louisiana.gov/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx?Type=3&Doc
=259 (Exhibit B).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c) (2011) (Claims Procedure); 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2011) (Oil Spill Liabil-
ity Trust Fund).
24. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2011).
25. Id. § 2702(b)(2) (available for the United States, individual states, Native American tribes,
and foreign trustees).
26. Id.
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profits resulting from destruction of real or personal property or natural
resources,27 and lost taxes and fees.28 Under OPA, claimants may seek in-
terim payments for damages, without foreclosing their ability to seek addi-
tional payments for future damages.2 9 OPA caps liability at $75 million for
responsible parties, unless there is gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a
violation of applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regula-
tion.3 0 OPA permits state legislatures to promulgate laws for oil-spill liabil-
ity in excess of OPA limits.31 Florida, Louisiana, and Texas also have
"mini-OPA" statutes that may also provide grounds for recovery.3 2 Certain
state statutes may bestow on private landowners various riparian rights and
common-law claims for damage adjacent to the shoreline 3 3 or damage to
oyster beds leased from the state. 3 4  In addition, claimants might seek re-
covery under state common-law tort claims, such as negligence, 5 nui-
sance,36 trespass, or strict liability,38 which might authorize punitive
damages; 39 such claims would need to overcome the pure economic loss
rule denying tort recovery solely for loss of profits, but courts may make an
exception for commercial fishermen.40
In June 2010, BP created an initial claims process for loss of income




30. Id. § 2704(a)(1), (c)(1).
31. Id. § 2718(a), (c); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000); Bouchard Transp. Co. v.
Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 1998).
32. FLA. STAT. § 376.123 (2010); Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30:2451-2496 (2010); Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.159
(Vernon 2009); see also Stanley A. Millan, Escaping the "Black Hole" in the Gulf, 24 TUL. ENvTL. L.J.
41, 66 (2010) (discussing state mini-OPAs).
33. See ALA. CODE § 9-12-22 (2010); Stephen Gidiere, Mike Freeman & Mary Samuels, The
Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAw. 374, 378 (Sept. 2010).
34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:423 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 379.232 (2010); TEX. PARKS & WILD.
CODE ANN. § 1.011 (Vernon 2009); Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378.
35. See Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378.
36. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-123 (2010); Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378.
37. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-210 (2010) (real property), 6-5-262 (2010) (personal property);
Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378.
38. See Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378 (raising strict liability on the grounds of BP's alleg-
edly abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities).
39. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2011) ("Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 [Limitation
of Liability Act] shall . . . affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any persons under . . . State law, including common law."); Gidiere et al.,
supra note 33, at 376-78; cf Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (considering punitive
damages under federal maritime law in the Exxon Valdez spill, which pre-dated OPA).
40. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (limiting economic loss
recovery from the oil spill to commercial fishermen only); Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of
Pure Economic Loss, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 49, 53, 56-57 (2010); Marshall S. Shapo, The Legal Recourse
in a Sea of Oil, 57 RISK MOMT. MAG. (Dec. 2010), available at http://rmmagazine.com/MGTemplate.
l&IssuelD=351&AID=4218&Volume57&ShowArticle=1 (noting that the economic-loss rule in tort
law is "pockmarked with exceptions").
41. See Pili6, supra note 17, at 177.
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million cap on liability potentially applicable under OPA. 4 2 This prelimi-
nary claims program dispensed hundreds of millions of dollars to claimants
through the end of the summer of 2010.43 Yet tens of thousands of claim-
ants awaited payment, either because of documentation problems or ad-
ministrative slowness.44
In response to the crisis, President Obama called BP into the White
House and the President and his staff negotiated the creation of a $20 bil-
lion fund. 4 5 The President then used his first nationwide Oval Office ad-
dress to discuss the BP spill and also to announce the BP fund.4 6 In
particular, the President stated that "[i]n order to ensure that all legitimate
claims are paid out in a fair and timely manner, the account must and will
be administered by an independent third party." 47  In addition, the Presi-
dent promised that the fund would "not be controlled by BP." 48 A White
House Fact Sheet released with Mr. Feinberg's appointment promised "[a]
new, independent claims process will be created with the mandate to be
fairer, faster, and more transparent in paying damage claims by individuals
and businesses." 4 9  Similarly, after meeting with BP executives, the Presi-
dent stated in a press conference that the fund would be "administered by
an impartial, independent third party," and that claims would be "adminis-
tered as quickly, as fairly, and as transparently as possible." 50
The same day the President announced the fund, the White House and
BP chose Kenneth Feinberg as claim administrator, who is perhaps the
most well known claims administrator in the United States.51 In 1984, Mr.
42. BP Confirms Waiver of $75 Million Cap for Oil Spill, 269 ENV. COUNs. 6 (Jan. 2011); State-
ment of BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. Re Applicability of Limit of Liability Under Oil Pollution Act of
1990, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010). Another potential defendant, Transocean Ltd., which owned
the oil rig that exploded in BP spill, has sought to limit its liability to the $27.6 million value of the oil
rig, relying on the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 181-196. Quinn Bowman, Oil
Spill Liability A Complicated Legal Web, PBS NEWSHOUR, June 7, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/politics/jan-junel0/oillaw_06-04.html. But the U.S. Department of Justice has successfully chal-
lenged Transocean's limitation of liability with regard to OPA claims and various other federal statutes.
See Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378. Other putative defendants may include, inter alia, Halliburton,
whose cementing operations were involved in capping the well, and Cameron International, which pro-
vided the blow-out preventers that did not prevent the spill. See id.
43. See Gidiere et al., supra note 33, at 378; Press Release, July 28, 2010, BP, "Total Claims
Payments Top $256 Million," http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&contentld=706
4024 (last visited July 9, 2011).
44. See Pili6, supra note 17, at 177.
45. See Press Release, June 16, 2010, The White House, FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow,
"Independent Claims Facility," http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-claims-and-es-
crow (last visited July 9, 2011).
46. Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill, supra note 5.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. See FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow, supra note 45.
50. See Press Release, June 16, 2010, The white House, Statement by the President After Meet-
ing with BP Executive, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-after-meetilg-
with-bp-executives (last visited July 9, 2011).
51. See Statement of President After Meeting with BP Executives, supra note 50 ("We've mutu-
ally agreed that Ken Feinberg will run the independent claims process we're putting in place.");
MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 5; see generally Terry Carter, The Master of Disasters: Is It Just Him,
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Feinberg served as a mediator in the $180 million Agent Orange class set-
tlement that provided compensation to veterans claiming health injuries
stemming from the Agent Orange defoliants sprayed during the Vietnam
conflict.52 In addition, Mr. Feinberg served as a trustee of the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust.5 Mr. Feinberg also served as the claim administra-
tor for the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund created by Congress after the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001.54 In
2007, Mr. Feinberg administered the fund assembled to compensate victims
of the university shooting at Virginia Tech, in which thirty-two persons
died." More recently, President Obama appointed Mr. Feinberg to over-
see executive salaries for entities receiving funds from the Trouble Asset
Relief Program following the 2008 financial crisis.56
The entity created to disburse the $20 billion BP fund was named the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility." Under the formal trust agreement, executed
in August 2010, BP agreed to create the $20 billion fund by providing $5
billion to the Trust by the end of 2010 and $1.25 billion per quarter to the
Trust between 2011 and 2013." The formal trust agreement named two
individual trustees, Kent Syverud, Dean of Washington University School
of Law, and former federal judge John S. Martin, Jr.,5 9 and stated that each
individual trustee was to be compensated at $100,000 per year.60 In addi-
tion, the trust agreement named Mr. Kenneth Feinberg as GCCF Claims
Administrator. 6 ' The GCCF sought to pay not only claims related to OPA,
but also state-tort claims for physical injury and death.62 At the expiration
of the trust, all unused GCCF funds are to be returned to BP.63
or Is Kenneth Feinberg Changing the Course of Mass Tort Resolution?, 97 A.B.A. J. 32 (2011) (discuss-
ing Mr. Feinberg's career in mass tort claims resolution).
52. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
passim (1987); Pili6, supra note 17, at 177.
53. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
79 (1990); Georgene Vairo, Why Me? The Role of Private Trustees in Complex Claims Resolution, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1391, 1392 (2005).
54. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE Vicrims OF 9/11 (2005).
55. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Compensating the Victims of Catastrophe: The Virginia Tech Vic-
tims Assistance Program, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 181 (2007); Laura Parker, A Conversation with BP's
Pay Czar, Kenneth Feinberg, AOL NEws, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/10/a-conversa-
tion-with-bps-pay-czar-kenneth-feinberg/.
56. See Parker, supra note 55.
57. See id.
58. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 12, at 2.
59. Id. at 1. The corporate trustee was Citigroup Trust-Delaware, N.A. Id.
60. Id. at Schedule B-2-1.
61. Id. at 1.
62. See Pili6, supra note 17, at 177; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 12,
at 1. Under the GCCF protocol, BP may appeal awards over $500,000 made by Mr. Feinberg. Gulf
Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, 6(B)(1), Feb. 8, 2011, http://www.gulf
coastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4. BP may appeal awards of less than $500,000 if Mr. Feinberg approves.
Id. 6(B)(2).
63. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 12, at 9.
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With regard to claims for loss of income from distant businesses, Mr.
Feinberg initially disfavored payment, but subsequently stated "that a geo-
graphic test to determine eligibility regarding economic harm due to the oil
spill is unwarranted."' Mr. Feinberg's decisions with regard to which in-
dustries may seek compensation have drawn criticism, including from the
federal Department of Justice65 and state attorneys general.66 The GCCF
distributed emergency checks for six months of lost profits, with claims
filed by the end of November 2010.67 Subsequently, until April 2013, Mr.
Feinberg is to assess and offer a final claim payment, acceptance of which
would require claimants to waive all additional claims, though claimants
may also instead continue to apply for interim quarterly payments.6 " In
December 2010, Mr. Feinberg introduced a quick-pay option under which
those already approved for an emergency payment could obtain an addi-
tional "quick pay" option of $5,000 for an individual or $25,000 for a busi-
ness, provided that any future claims against BP or other responsible
parties were waived. 6 9 The GCCF does not offer payments for alleged pu-
nitive damages.7 0 The GCCF protocol provides that for final claims, a
claimant may appeal a monetary award in excess of $250,000 and BP may
appeal an award in excess of $500,000, with appeals heard by a three-judge
64. See Feinberg Announces Clarification Regarding Geographic Proximity, Oct. 4, 2010, http://
www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press7.php; see also Editorial, Feinberg Finally Gets It, PENSACOLA
NEWS JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 2010 (discussing Mr. Feinberg's move away from a purely geographic test for
claims eligibility).
65. See, e.g., David Hammer, Kenneth Feinberg's Use of Industry Categories in Scoring Claims Is
Criticized, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/02/
justice departmen tscolds_fein.html.
66. See, e.g., Gulf Spill Fund Czar Paying for Ethics Advice, supra note 16 (noting a November
24, 2010 letter from Louisiana Attorney General James Caldwell questioning the independence of the
GCCF and Mr. Feinberg); Anita Lee, Hood Wants Someone Looking over Feinberg's Shoulder, SUN
HERALD, Jan. 25, 2011 (relating Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood's request that the MDL court
appoint a person to oversee Mr. Feinberg, and noting Attorney General Hood's concerns about legal
waivers and inconsistency in payments); Louisiana Jindal, Caldwell Wants Court to Oversee Feinberg in
BP Claims, BAYOUBUZZ NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.bayoubuzz.com/buzz/latest-buzz/164361-
louisiana-jindal-caldwell-wants-court-to-oversee-feinberg-in-bp-claims.
67. See Pilid, supra note 17, at 177.
68. See Parker, supra note 55; Pili6, supra note 17; BP Oil Spill to Get New Options for Compen-
sation, 28 No. 24 WEST. J. Toxic TORTS 8 (2011); Laura Parker, BP Has Made Only I Final Payment:
$10M to Texas Firm, AOL NEWS, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/31/bp-has-made-only-
1-final-payment-10m-to-texas-firm/ (noting single $10 million final payment made to Texas firm). Mr.
Feinberg has stated that without waivers, "I would be totally ineffective in trying to shut down the
litigation. We're trying to streamline the process. And end lawsuits." Parker, supra note 55.
69. David Hammer, Most BP Oil Spill Claimants Opt for One-Time "Quick payment", TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 26, 2011, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/01/most-bpoil-spill-
claimantsop.html; Jim Snyder & Carol Massar, Feinberg Says Half of BP Fund May Cover Spill
Claims, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-05/
feinberg-says-half-of-bp-fund-may-cover-spill-claims.html.
70. With regard to punitive damages, Mr. Feinberg has stated,
I'm not begrudging anybody who wants punitive damages. If you want punitive damages,
don't take anything from the fund. Punitive damages is a judicial concept. I have no idea
whether punitive damages are even credible here. This is a fund designed to compensate for
loss, not punish BP.
Parker, supra note 55.
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panel to be determined. With regard to the decision to accept a final
claim, Mr. Feinberg stated that "the alternative, suing BP, could take five
years and produce the same result."72 Mr. Feinberg has also suggested that
claimants might seek compensation under the claims process without hav-
ing to pay plaintiff's counsel," and the GCCF reports that only a small
percentage of claimants have lawyers.7 4 Indeed, many claimants fired their
attorneys after the fund's announcement and pursued fund compensation
without counsel." Through January 2011, the GCCF had received more
than 450,000 claims and paid approximately $2.7 billion to greater than
170,000 claimants, more than $140 million of which went for the final
quick-pay option. 7 6 The GCCF has denied claims due to inadequate docu-
mentation, as well as claims being insufficiently related to the oil spill.7
Mr. Feinberg has predicted that perhaps $10 billion of the $20 billion fund
will be returned to BP."
Litigation is currently pending against BP in various courts. The Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered all federal litigation concern-
ing the BP Gulf oil spill be transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana,
under Judge Barbier. Additional litigation proceeds against BP in state
courts, as well. Plaintiffs have brought hundreds of lawsuits. 79
For administering the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, BP is compensating
Mr. Feinberg's two-partner firm, Feinberg Rozen, at the rate of $850,000
per month, with quarterly review and renegotiation of that fee between Mr.
71. See Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 62.
72. Daniel Kruger & Tom Keane, BP Shrimp Losses Hard to Calculate, Feinberg Says, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 25, 2010.
73. See Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow of the Law: A
Template from the Superfund §301(E) Report, 40 ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11121, 11123
(2010) (noting that Mr. Feinberg has stated, "Under this program, you will receive, if you're eligible,
compensation without having to go to court for years, without the uncertainty of going to court, since
I'll be much more generous than a court will be. At the same time, you won't have to pay lawyers and
costs.").
74. See Hammer, supra note 69 (according to the GCCF, only three percent of claimants had
counsel).
75. See Light, supra note 73, at 11122 (relating one Louisiana attorney stating, after the fund's
creation, that "[p]eople are firing their lawyers right and left").
76. See Parker, supra note 55; Snyder & Massar, supra note 69.
77. See Parker, supra note 55 (quoting Mr. Feinberg as saying he would deny as too indirect the
claim of a dentist who claims reduced business because of the spill); David C. Wilkes, An Interview with
Ken Feinberg, 82 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 10, 17 (2010) (discussing eligibility, calculation, and corroboration
of losses for the BP oil spill).
78. See Louis Cooper, Q&A: Feinberg Talks About Claims Process, PENSACOLA NEWS JOURNAL,
Feb. 8, 2011, at Al ("[A] couple of weeks ago, just looking at the raw data ... it seemed to me that $10
billion would be more than adequate. .. . This ($10 billion) is what I think, but it remains to be seen.");
Snyder & Massar, supra note 69 (noting Mr. Feinberg's estimate that $10 billion may be sufficient to
compensate victims).
79. See Gulf Spill Fund Czar Paying for Ethics Advice, supra note 16 (noting more than 300
lawsuits have been filed); see generally Edward F. Sherman, The BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving
Supervision of Multidistrict Litigation Judges, 30 Miss. C.L. REV. 237 (2011) (discussing multidistrict
litigation proceedings in connection with the BP Gulf oil spill).
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Feinberg and BP.so That fee, which is separately paid by BP and not de-
ducted from the GCCF, covers not only Feinberg Rozen's two partners, but
also a senior consulting attorney, project manager, and director of special
projects, as well as two additional attorneys hired specifically for the
GCCF-related work.8t Additional subcontractor costs for the GCCF are
passed through to BP for payment.8 2 When working as a mediator, Mr.
Feinberg generally eschews the billable hour, in favor of a flat fee and suc-
cess fee. 3 With regard to Ken Feinberg's pay structure, Ken Feinberg has
stated that he works for "the escrow agreement signatories, which is the
Department of Justice and BP." 84 Feinberg also stated, "I like to think I
am working for the people of the Gulf. That's who I am really trying to
help," noting that "[n]either the administration nor BP has exercised any
undue influence over what I try to do." 85 Mr. Feinberg cannot be fired by
BP, unless the United States Department of Justice also approves. 86
In February 2011, however, in response to a motion for plaintiffs, the
federal multidistrict litigation court issued an opinion finding that Mr. Fein-
berg and the GCCF were not "independent" of BP.87 In addition, the or-
der regulated communications between the GCCF and claimants, citing the
court's authority to control communications to putative class members."
Plaintiff attorneys89 and state attorneys general9 0 also have called into
question Mr. Feinberg's independence from BP.
80. See Jim Snyder & Lizzie O'Leary, Spill Fund Legal Fees So Far: $2.5 Million, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/7239134.html (stating firm was paid
$850,000 a month by BP); Harry R. Weber, Feinberg Discussing Future Pay for Spill Fund Work, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110118/us-gulf-oil-spill-feinberg/;
MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 8.
81. See MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 6-7.
82. Id. at 7-8.
83. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Billing Reform Initiatives, 59 ALE. L. REV. 963, 965 (1996).
84. Cooper, supra note 78. The Department of Justice was not a signatory to the fund trust
agreement. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 12, at 1.
85. See Cooper, supra note 78.
86. See Dan Murtaugh, Contract: BP Sets Ken Feinberg's Salary, Will Get Oil Spill Claims Docu-
ments, PRESs-REGISTER, Jan. 19, 2011, http://blog.al.com/live/2011/01/contract-between bp-andfeinbe.
html.
87. See Order, supra note 4, at 9.
88. Id.
89. See Light supra note 73, at 11122 (noting that "the plaintiffs' bar accused [Mr. Feinberg] of
being a 'tool of BP.. . who wants hardworking people to sign releases for far fewer dollars than they
deserve'').
90. See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP Deliberately 'Underpaying'
Claims, Mississippi Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/bp-de-
liberately-underpaying-claims-mississippi-says.html (stating that Mississippi Attorney General Jim
Hood alleged that the fund delayed payment of claims to pressure "financially desperate" claimants to
accept low settlements); Light, supra note 73, at 11122 (noting that the Alabama Attorney General
referred to Mr. Feinberg as "a 'corporate shill' for BP"); Rowena Mason, HP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
Fund "Underpaying victims", TELEGRAPH, Feb. 3, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysec-
tor/energy/oilandgas/8299361/BP-Gulf-of-Mexico-oil-spill-fund-underpaying-victims.html (relating Mis-
sissippi Attorney General Jim Hood's statement that "BP is withholding interim claim payments to
increase financial hardship on claimants."); Ann Zimmerman, State Officials Step Up Criticism of HP
Oil-Spill Fund, WALL STr. J., Feb. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870432910457
6138342199677406.html (noting that Mississippi, Florida, and Louisiana "publicly questioned Mr. Fein-
berg's repeated claim of independence").
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III. THE QUASI-PUBLIC CLAIMS FUND: ORIGINS,
BENEFITS, AND CONCERNS
To understand the quasi-public claims fund, we might situate it in the
context of other types of funds. A "claims fund" is a group of money desig-
nated to pay physically or economically injured persons, according to some
set of rules as to who gets paid and how much, and the claims fund may
supplant other potential avenues of recovery, such as court lawsuits.9 1 The
rules for claimant eligibility may be determined at the outset of the fund, or
left to the claim administrator to craft. 92
On one side, we have what might be called public claims funds. The
government creates such funds, and claimants likely deem these funds the
most legitimate and trustworthy.93 Recently, the 9/11 Victims Compensa-
tion Fund, which was created by Congress, provides an example of such a
public fund.94 There, the claims fund for 9/11 victims was drawn from pub-
lic tax revenue, and 9/11 fund administrator Ken Feinberg performed pro
bono-a remarkable and laudable act.9 5 Further back, the federal Black
Lung Program provides another example of a public fund, enabling com-
pensation to miners diagnosed with black lung disease.9' In the Black
Lung Program, a tax on industry provided the revenue for the fund.97 But,
Congress and government officials paid through government funds publicly
set the terms of compensation payments to miners,98 and the government
91. Cf Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361, 1361 (2005) (defining a "claims resolution facility" as "a generic term used to describe a
wide range of entities that process and resolve claims made against a potential funding source").
92. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (1995) (noting claims
facilities may be merely administrative payment schemes, or "individualized dispute resolution proce-
dures"); Vairo, supra note 53, at 1392 (discussing authority of private persons to fashion compensation
awards for claimants); cf Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and Death
of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 185-91 (2003); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited:
The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131 (1989) ("One clear example of
such ad hoc proceduralism comes via the increased number of judicial adjuncts, who customize proce-
dure for particular and individual cases.").
93. See McGovern, supra note 91, at 1367 (stating that "[t]ypically, the more governmental the
authority, the more legitimate the facility"); id at 1375 (noting that "[i]n essence, the strategy is a
search for legitimacy"); cf Vairo, supra note 53, at 1413 (arguing that for mass tort litigation, "the
process developed and implemented by trustees must be perceived as legitimate").
94. See FEINBERG, supra note 54; KENNETH FEINBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REP. OF
THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004), http://
www.justice.gov/final report.pdf; Deborah Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Res-
olution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429,1430 n.3 (2005) (presenting 9/11 Victim Compensation fund as
public alternative to private claims resolution facility); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for
Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 438 (2003).
95. See Hechler, supra note 11, at 20.
96. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 15 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.); Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Pro-
gram: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 683 (1989).
97. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 96, at 683.
98. See id. at 671.
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also paid the program's administrators at the Social Security Administra-
tion and U.S. Department of Labor.99 Congress has also considered, but
not passed, a public claims fund for asbestos litigation.10 0
Because a public fund seeks full compensation of all valid claims and
claim administrators have no incentive to provide plaintiffs with anything
other than full compensation, claimants to a public fund might generally
wish to avoid paying plaintiff counsel fees-which might amount to one-
third of the total award-and instead claimants might merely submit a
claims form and take compensation without counsel. With regard to the
goals of the tort system, the public fund might well achieve compensation
of injured claimants. But the goal of deterring tortfeasors and serving cor-
rective justice may not be so well-served, if public tax revenue is used, as in
9/11,101 or if a whole industry is generally taxed, as in the Black Lung Pro-
gram,102 because the specific tortfeasor is not directly paying for the harm
caused. While overall social transaction costs might be low because claim-
ants might not retain lawyers, the public fund might suffer from additional
expenditures related to fraud if claims are not closely scrutinized by admin-
istrators spending general public funds. As economist Milton Friedman ob-
served, entities spend most carefully when it is their own money at stake-
not the public's.'o3 Indeed, the Black Lung Program has been criticized as
subject to fraud.104
On the other side from public claims funds, we have another approach:
private claims funds. Professor Deborah Hensler has noted that such pri-
vate claims resolution facilities "are distinguished from such administrative
tribunals and social welfare and other public compensation programs by
the fact that they are private entities; their rules are not subject to broad
public debate, and their outcomes are often protected from public scru-
tiny."10 Most recently, in modern mass tort litigation, such as that con-
cerning Vioxx, a pain medication allegedly linked to heart problems,
defendant Merck offered claimants a $4.85 billion settlement, which was
negotiated by Merck's lawyers and certain prominent plaintiffs' counsel,
99. See id. at 670.
100. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure
of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 272-78 (2006).
101. See JOAN BERNOTT MAGINNIS, THE 9/11 Vic-rIM COMPENSATION FUND: OVERVIEW AND
COMMENT (2007), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070326_VictimFund.pdf.
102. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 96, at 683.
103. See MIuTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 116
(1990).
104. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 96, at 734 (noting that "the program has been plagued by
fraud and abuse"); cf John Schwartz, Claims to BP Fund Attract Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/us/03feinberg.html (discussing fraudulent claims in connection with
the $20 billion BP fund).
105. Hensler, Alternative Courts?, supra note 94, at 1430; see also Vairo, supra note 53, at 1394
(discussing the "hybridization ot complex claims resolution," including not only judiciary and other
government officials, but also private parties); cf Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (noting that judges have increasingly been supported by
"a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight personnel"); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving
Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L.
REV. 413, 431-37 (1999) (likening mass tort litigation to "private aggregate claim resolution").
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representing their clients.106 In the Vioxx fund, each plaintiff desiring to
take part had to agree individually to settle his or her claims. 0 7 An earlier
example of a private claims fund might be the attempts by asbestos compa-
nies to create and fund a separate entity to settle asbestos claims-for ex-
ample, the Asbestos Claims Facility and Center for Claims Resolution in
the 1980s.' 0
Unlike the public fund, which seeks to offer just compensation, the
private fund might be seen as essentially a settlement offer that may dis-
count full compensation, but provide claimants quick and certain recovery.
As a result, claimants likely need to retain and pay their own lawyers to
evaluate the fund's offer. For example, claimants would likely need advice
of counsel about whether to accept a Vioxx deal offered by Merck, and
perhaps negotiated by the lawyers for other claimants. Similarly, claimants
would understandably question the offers of asbestos companies seeking to
settle their claims, thinking the asbestos companies and their claims fund
staff served the asbestos companies' interests, rather than public justice,
and disputes might arise not only as to amount of compensation, but also as
to types of compensated injuries.
With regard to the tort goals of deterrence and compensation, the suc-
cess of the private fund, which is tantamount to mass settlement, depends
on the deal struck. But we might expect that properly incentivized attor-
neys vying in an adversary system, with tort law as the backdrop and the
threat of trial always present, would result in deals that generally appropri-
ately would deter tortfeasors, and that might or might not compensate the
needs of claimants, depending on the merit of their claims. Of course, the
ending of formal litigation through a private claims fund also saves substan-
tial attorneys' fees-particularly among defense attorneys who predomi-
nantly bill by the hour.
Between these two poles-the public fund and the private fund-en-
ters the Gulf Coast Claims Facility created after the BP Oil Spill.109 The
GCCF is best considered a quasi-public fund. Like the private fund, the
GCCF is funded by the defendant-here, BP-and its administrators are
paid by BP. But before we consider the GCCF to be just like the Vioxx
settlement, we need to consider the full context of the fund's creation.
That context is what renders the fund quasi-public, and its administrators
quasi-judicial.110
106. See David Voreacos & Allen Johnson, Merck Paid 3468 Death Claims to Resolve Vioxx Law-
suits, BLOOMBERG, Jul. 27, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-27/merck-paid-3-468-death-
claims-to-resolve-vioxx-suits.html; Official Vioxx Settlement, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/
(last visited July 9, 2011).
107. See Official Vioxx Settlement, supra note 106.
108. See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBs. 13
(Autumn 1990); Hensler, supra note 92, at 1608-09.
109. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/ (last visited July 9, 2011).
110. Cf Vairo, supra note 53, at 1400 (raising the concern that private claims administrators have
received an "ad hoc judicial mantle").
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The Gulf Coast Claims Facility shows elements of both the private and
public claims fund. Like other private funds, the GCCF is funded solely by
defendants, and claimants choose to settle any legal claims in return for
participating in the fund. 11 But like other public funds, the GCCF offered
a governmental guarantee of a trustworthy process that would fairly and
fully compensate claimants. In particular, the President and the White
House negotiated the creation of the GCCF with BP. In the President's
first nationwide Oval Office address, which was devoted to the BP oil spill,
the President promised that the fund would be administered by an "inde-
pendent third party," and would not be "controlled by BP."'
1 2 The Presi-
dent also promised that the claims would be paid in a "fair . .. manner."113
In promising all this, the President should be considered to have given a
public imprimatur to the BP fund. That combination of private and public
is what makes the Gulf Coast Claims Facility a quasi-public claims fund.
1 14
There are some analogs to the quasi-public fund presented by the
GCCF. Close to the private fund, but with some public oversight, are
claims funds created in the context of bankruptcy or class-action settle-
ments. Examples of bankruptcy claims funds include the asbestos trusts,
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, or Dow Corning Silicone Gel Breast Im-
plant Trust,' 15 and class-action-settlement claims funds include Agent Or-
ange, Fen-Phen, Polybutylene (PB) Pipes Facility, and Prudential Claims
Facility.' 16 In bankruptcy and class-action settlements, such private claims
funds receive some judicial oversight when the judge approves a bank-
ruptcy reorganization plan in Chapter 11 or class settlement under Rule
23.117 But no prior fund has been negotiated with the tortfeasor by the
111. See Carter, supra note 51 (noting multidistrict litigation plaintiffs' executive committee mem-
ber Stephen Herman's comment on Mr. Feinberg that "'[it's extremely dangerous for someone . . . to
be cloaked in this specter of independence, when in fact he's nothing more than a defense lawyer trying
to settle cases for BP"). In the 9/11 fund, which I have characterized as a public fund, claimants also
agreed to forego any separate claim if they participated in the fund. See FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 21
(noting the "unique statutory choice: sue in court or participate in the fund, one or the other").
112. See Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill, supra note 5.
113. Id.
114. Cf Order, supra note 4, at 8 (referring to BP fund as "a hybrid entity, rather than one that is
fully independent of BP").
115. See Hensler, Alternative Courts?, supra note 94, at 1431; Vairo, supra note 53, at 1397 (noting
the increasing use of bankruptcy by asbestos companies to resolve mass tort actions and seek global
peace), 1400 (discussing "paramount importance" of prepackaged asbestos bankruptcy plans under 11
U.S.C. § 524(g)); Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 93, 93-95 (2004).
116. See SCHUCK, supra note 52, at 143-67; Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life After Amchem: The Class
Struggle Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 373 (1998) (discussing continuing attempts to certify settle-
ment class actions); Hensler, Alternative Courts?, supra note 94, at 1431; Vairo, supra note 53, at 1399
(noting continuing approval of class settlements, notwithstanding Amchem concerns); see generally
Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 Rev. LITIG. 883, 897,
913 (2007) (listing class-action settlements and bankruptcy-trust-paid tort claims from 1960s onward);
Joseph F. Rice & Nancy worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class
Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 405 (1999).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (court must approve class settlement as "fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate"); Hensler, Alternative Courts?, supra note 94, at 1435 (describing bankruptcy court approval of
Chapter 11 reorganization plan including Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust Fund).
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President of the United States and promised by the President to offer
"fair" compensation to claimants.
The quasi-public claims fund offers several benefits. First, the quasi-
public claims fund allows for the relatively swift creation of a claimant
fund, designed in part by an elected branch of government that should be
committed to justice. This swiftness was of course extremely important in
the context of the BP spill, where economic losses posed a threat to the
economies of entire regions abutting the Gulf. Indeed, the BP Gulf oil spill
arguably presented a kind of systemic threat to the Gulf area economy that
could be likened to the recent global financial crisis that also spurred the
Executive Branch to intervene." 8 The quasi-public claims fund may also
lead to wide compensation of claimants, as well as deter tortfeasors, and
serve corrective justice, because the tortfeasor pays for the fund. Further-
more, the quasi-public fund may also assist defendants in obtaining public
goodwill by quickly admitting its problems and offering compensation to
injured parties." 9
But what about attorneys' fees? Will the quasi-public claims fund save
attorneys' fees? If claimants choose the fund, rather than litigation, then
defense counsel fees are likely saved, since defense counsel generally bills
hourly. But what about plaintiffs' counsel? If claim valuations are ques-
tionable, claimants might benefit from counsel's assessment of whether to
participate in the fund or seek a possible better deal through litigation, but
claimants would then need to pay counsel substantial fees, perhaps the
one-third traditional contingent fee. Plaintiffs' counsel could agree to limit
their fee to less than one-third of the total recovery, given the certainty and
ease of recovery, in light of ethical requirements of only charging a reason-
able fee. 120 But, the surest way to limit plaintiffs' counsel fees and thereby
reduce overall societal transaction costs for the fund, would be if claimants
chose to apply for fund compensation without retaining counsel. 12 1
This question-whether claimants need counsel-has been significant
for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. It stems from the central confusion at-
tending the quasi-public fund, because it shares aspects of public justice,
where claimants might not need counsel, as well as private settlement nego-
tiation, where claimants would desire counsel. The problem also has not
been avoided by BP's recent proposal to pay for legal-aid counsel for
118. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) Information, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm (last visited July 9,
2011).
119. In addition to seeking public goodwill, BP of course also had to satisfy its responsibilities for
private economic loss claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2011) (stating
that "responsible party shall establish a procedure for the payment or settlement of claims for interim,short-term damages"). The Gulf Coast Claims Facility, however, goes beyond BP's responsibilities
under the Oil Pollution Act, because the Facility also seeks to settle claims tor personal injury and
death. Order, supra note 4, at 10; Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims,
supra note 62.
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.5(a) (requiring that fees be reasonable).
121. See Carter, supra note 51, at 37 (noting Mr. Feinberg's statement that a gulf coast shrimper
"'doesn't need a lawyer, doesn't have to pay a lawyer 40 percent of what he receives'").
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claimants. 122 First, legal aid lawyers may not be as skilled or experienced
as plaintiff tort litigators in ascertaining their chances of prevailing at trial,
and for how much, and evaluating tort settlement offers. In any event, the
quasi-public fund would be more efficient for society if no claimant counsel
were needed at all. Lastly, the method of payment of the legal aid lawyers
only opens up another area for analysis for potential incentives and bias.
That the GCCF is a quasi-public claims fund is apt to cause confusion
from claimants on the important question of whether claimants should re-
tain counsel in connection with their decision to participate in the GCCF or
sue.123 Is the GCCF a public fund where claimants may comfortably seek
payments without their own counsel? Or is the GCCF a private fund
presenting a settlement offer that must be carefully evaluated with the aid
of counsel? The President's involvement and promise of an "independent
third party" running the fund suggest the former, but BP's supplying the
GCCF funds and paying the GCCF administrators might suggest the latter.
In fact, claimants have likely been confused about the status of the fund,1
24
and plaintiffs' counsel have questioned the running of the fund, perhaps in
part because of their financial interest in justifying their services to
claimants.12 5
Although the White House negotiated the overall size of the BP fund,
the White House did not negotiate the specific details of which claimants
would receive compensation or how much compensation.126 Those impor-
tant issues were left to the claims administrator, Ken Feinberg, to deter-
mine.127 Who qualifies for economic loss? What businesses should be
included? How far inland may they be? What type of proof is required to
document a claim? In deciding whether to pursue the fund, and whether
they needed, and should pay for, counsel, claimants understandably turned
to scrutinizing the fund's structure. Was it in fact run by an "Independent
third party" such that they could trust that the claim offers were "fair," as
the President had promised they would be?
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE QUASI-PUBLIC FUND
To counteract concerns of claimant confusion and incentivize claim-
ants to opt-in without having to retain and pay for attorneys, the quasi-
public claims fund should seek to provide (1) transparency in its claims
122. See Dan Murtaugh, Gulf Coast Claims Facility Pays Lawyers to Offer Free Legal Advice,
PREss-REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2011, http://blog.al.com/live/2011/01/gulf coast-claimsfacility-pay.html (not-
ing the GCCF paying for seventeen attorneys at a dozen legal aid groups).
123. See Order, supra note 4, at 12 (finding "that the hybrid role of Mr. Feinberg and the GCCF
has led to confusion and misunderstanding by claimants, especially those who are unrepresented by
their own counsel").
124. See Fisher, supra note 1.
125. See Order, supra note 4, at 9.
126. See FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow, supra note 45.
127. See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, supra note 12.
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administrator compensation structure 28 and (2) a claims-administrator
compensation structure that preserves independence.129
Because some confusion about roles is inherent in the quasi-public
claims fund, we should expect that claimants will want more information
and may become concerned that they are being misled. Who is paying the
administrators and designers of the fund? How much are they getting
paid? Might claim-administrator pay be renegotiated or changed by the
defendant, which could run the risk of incentivizing those administrators to
favor the defendant's interests rather than claimants, if leftover claim funds
are returned to the defendant? To stop this concern, and to encourage
claimants to participate in the fund, the claim administrators of a quasi-
public fund should provide clear descriptions to claimants of the pay struc-
ture for claims administrators.
Mr. Feinberg and his firm initially may have avoided discussing their
pay structure because they feared it would anger claimants to hear how
much Mr. Feinberg and his firm were being paid and by whom.13 0 Instead,
Mr. Feinberg may have believed it best that claimants focus on what they
are receiving, rather than ask about how fund administrators are being
paid.13' For example, in response to early reporter inquiries on Mr. Fein-
berg's compensation, Mr. Feinberg said that his compensation "would be
confidential."132
But, the larger problem in not embracing pay transparency for the
fund is that it may have increased claimants' suspicions, and, as a result,
perhaps diminished participation, 3 because claimants may not trust that
the process is neutral. Here, the claimants have suffered economically be-
cause of the oil spill of BP and likely are skeptical of BP's intentions with
the fund. They likely are worried that BP might be shaping the fund so as
to maximize the funds returned to BP and may fear that the President and
the White House have moved their focus onto other pressing matters.
Apart from transparency, claims administrators in a quasi-public
claims fund should, of course, also be paid in a method that is optimally
designed to enhance neutrality and independence. Obviously, if one dis-
closes that a claims administrator will get a bonus from the tortfeasor if the
claims administrator gives out little money, then claimants will not sign up
128. In a recent article, Mr. Feinberg discussed the value of transparency in mass torts, but did not
address specifically the topic of transparency in claim-administrator compensation. Kenneth R. Fein-
berg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and External Value of Sunlight, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
473 (2009).
129. See McGovern, supra note 91, at 1387 (stating with regard to "[i]ndependence, neutrality,
and experience," that "[t]hese qualities are necessary for the operation of a claims facility"); Vairo,
supra note 53, at 1393 (arguing for "independent trustees," but raising concerns about the "repeat
player problem" involving recurring appointment of only a few individuals in each claim fund).
130. See Stier, supra note 1.
131. See id
132. See id.
133. Mr. Feinberg has stated that his test for success of the fund is the participation rate of claim-
ants, which he sees as an indicator of "whether people think the program is fair." Parker, supra note 55.
Mr. Feinberg aims for a participation rate of 90% in the GCCF. Id. (noting that the 9/11 fund had a
97% participation rate, and the Virginia Tech fund had a 100% participation rate).
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or at least will feel they need the advice of plaintiffs' counsel about whether
to participate.
So, how should a fund pay a claims administrator to preserve indepen-
dence? If the tortfeasor is effectively admitting responsibility, it does make
sense for the tortfeasor to pay administrator salaries, rather than split the
costs with claimants. Nor should society have to pay via tax revenue. So
some one-sidedness of pay may be unavoidable. As a result, here, the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility was right to conclude that only BP should pay the
claims administrators. 134
But, the method of pay could be such as to minimize the risk of claims
administrators' catering to the defendant by reducing fund payouts and re-
turning to the defendant from the leftover money in the fund. Here, for
example, billions of dollars are projected to return to BP after claimants
are paid.'35 As a result, claimants might think there is a risk that claims
administrators might seek to please BP by limiting claim awards-and in
return, the claims administrators might hope for greater pay from BP. One
solution would be for the claims administrator to be paid via a flat fee-
either one fixed sum or monthly payments for the duration-that is not
subject to renegotiation during the fund's existence.
But what if the amount of work is unknown, varying, or unpredict-
able? Then, a single fixed fee may not be flexible enough. That was the
situation with the BP fund, as former Attorney General Michael Mukasey
opined in an evaluative report.' 36 The Gulf Coast Claims Facility's re-
sponse to this problem was to use a fixed fee, paid monthly and subject to
renegotiation.' 37  One benefit of that approach is that a flat fee does not
involve BP in approving or disapproving specific billable hours.
1 38 But the
problem arises from the renegotiation of the monthly fee.'
39 When the
renegotiation occurs, claimants might worry that BP could seek to reward
claim administrators for minimizing awards, and claim administrators
might be seeking to curry favor with BP.
134. As Mr. Feinberg has stated,
Who else should pay for the cost of the entire program but the wrong-doer? Every time
somebody says to me, "Well, there's a conflict of interest because BP is ultimately footing the
bill," I say, "Do you have a better idea?" You can't ask the claimants to pay. You can't ask
the federal and state and local government to foot the bill. You can't ask [ethics consultant]
Gillers or Feinberg or anybody else to work for free. So who but BP should pay the bill?
Id.
135. See Snyder & Massar, supra note 69.
136. MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 27 (stating that "[b]ecause of the uncertainties, the rela-
tively long duration of the Facility, and the need to ensure that fee payments are consistent with efforts
expended . . . , we recommend that the parties continue the fees at the current rate, but agree to revisit
the issue at intervals of [four] months or some other fixed period").
137. See Order, supra note 4, at 9-10 (noting that BP pays a flat fee to Mr. Feinberg and his firm
each month, and that fees are to be evaluated after January 15, 2011 and quarterly thereafter); see also
MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3.
138. See MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 9 (noting that "hourly billing invites a level of scrutiny
and management by the party paying the fee that is incompatible with the independence that is a
hallmark of this engagement").
139. See id.
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My proposal here would be that the bills of the claims administrator be
reviewed and approved by a trusted third party by which defendant agrees
to be bound. Something similar is generally done in class-action settle-
ments, where the defendants often agree to settle cases with plaintiffs and
pay whatever plaintiff attorneys' fees the judge determines are reasona-
ble. 140 Perhaps a panel of retired federal judges could serve this purpose
here? Or perhaps the Gulf Coast Claims Facility's trustees, which include
Washington University Law Dean Kent Syverud and former federal judge
John Martin, Jr.,141 could assist? The third-party panel might undertake
the task pro bono, following Mr. Feinberg's laudable charitable efforts in
the 9/11 fund. Or because the effort in reviewing bills is likely much more
predictable, the third party reviewing the bills might itself be paid on a
single, fixed fee or a monthly or annual fixed fee not subject to renegoti-
ation. Indeed, the GCCF trustees are to be paid $100,000 a year, without
renegotiation. 142
A final concern arises from the large overall amount of money being
paid-$850,000 a month-to Feinberg Rozen by BP. Even if the fees are
fixed or paid by a third party, might the overall payments to claims admin-
istrators be so great as to create a sense of bias toward the defendant?
Being personally guaranteed millions from the defendant might incline one
to save the defendant some money in making awards. Complicating this
concern is the general expectation in the United States that judges are paid
less, frequently much less, than top lawyers in private practice. People are
not accustomed to thinking of judges making $850,000 a year, much less
$850,000 a month, as Feinberg Rozen is being paid in the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility,14 3 or $8,000 a day, as the special masters in the Toyota un-
intended acceleration litigation are being paid. 14 4 Feinberg Rozen's being
paid $850,000 a month by BP may well be in line with high private-level
compensation, in a world where top private defense attorneys in major cit-
ies like New York (where Feinberg Rozen has an office), can charge more
than $1,000 an hour,' 45 and the nation's top plaintiff attorneys can make
even more through contingency fees if successful.146 In contrast, federal
140. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (h).
141. See Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, supra note 12.
142. See id. at Schedule B-2-1.
143. See MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 1. The Mukasey Memorandum discloses that in con-
nection with preparation of the memorandum, Feinberg Rozen compensated Michael Mukasey and his
firm, Debevoise Plimpton, at their usual billing rates. Id. at 3.
144. Order No. 6: Appointing Special Masters (Pursuant to Stipulation) at 9, In re: Toyota Motor
Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151
JVS(FMOx) (C.D. Cal 2010), available at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/Cacd/RecentPubop.nsf/f48205
2 5 d8 f9b4 878825770c0050bb9a/987093A5CO9A63628825778300761E41/$file/SA10MLO2151%2OJVS%2
00rder%206.pdf.
145. See Vanessa O'Connell, Top Lawyers Push $1,000-Plus an Hour Club, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2011, htp/oln~s~o/ril/B00445780010566322783.tl
146. See MUKASEY MEM., supra note 3, at 1, 11-25 (applying judicial criteria used to assess the
reasonableness of class-action fees under Rule 23, and finding Feimberg Rozen compensation "within
the range of reasonable compensation"). One criticism of the fee assessment completed by former
Attorney General Mukasey is that it compares Mr. Feinberg's fee to the prior fees of plaintiff lawyers in
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district court judges are currently paid under $200,000 a year. 14 7 One might
argue that judges' salaries should be raised closer to the high payments to
top lawyers in private practice, who may serve as third-party neutrals.' 48 In
light of Mr. Feinberg's quasi-judicial status in the GCCF and the desire to
increase the perceived legitimacy of the GCCF and claimant participation
in the fund, another solution might be for Feinberg Rozen to accept a level
of compensation that is also a hybrid of public and private-perhaps some-
thing more than the compensation of a public employee like a federal
judge, who also benefits from life tenure,149 but substantially less than the
current top-market private pay.
V. CONCLUSION
My advice is twofold for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in particular,
and the quasi-public claims fund generally-whose entry into the mass tort
toolbox should be welcomed for its potential to respond to rapidly develop-
ing crises, especially where the tortfeasor admits responsibility. First,
quasi-public funds, such as the GCCF, should embrace transparency in
claim-administrator pay, and second, they should create a structure for pay
that best preserves the independence and neutrality of ethical actors like
Mr. Feinberg-either through a non-renegotiable fixed fee, or through a
separate panel overseeing claim administrator compensation. That ap-
proach will maximize claimant participation in the fund, and reduce claim-
ants' needs to retain their own counsel, thus furthering swift claimant
compensation and greatly reducing transaction costs compared to
litigation.
specific class-action settlements, id. at 23-24, but plaintiff class-action lawyers are, of course, compen-
sated additionally for the risk they will not succeed in obtaining a settlement and be paid nothing,
whereas Mr. Feinberg needs no risk premium since his fees are guaranteed.
147. See Adam Liptak, How Much Should Judges Make?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/01/20/washington/20bar.htmi (noting that in 2009, federal district court judges were
paid $169,300 annually).
148. See Are Public-Sector Workers Overpaid or Underpaid?, EcoNomisT, Feb. 24, 2011, http://
www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeterf20l11/02/government~employer; Thomas L. Friedman, Singapore
and Katrina, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/14/opinion/14friedman.html
(describing Singapore's "good governance" and noting the prime minister is paid $1.1 million, Supreme
Court Justices are paid slightly under $1 million, and judges and senior civil servants are generally well
compensated).
149. U.S. CONsTr. art. III, § 1.

